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1Experimental Study on Key Generation for Physical
Layer Security in Wireless Communications
Junqing Zhang, Roger Woods, Senior Member, IEEE, Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE,
Alan Marshall, Senior Member, IEEE, Yuan Ding, Yi Huang, Senior Member, IEEE, and Qian Xu
Abstract—This paper presents a thorough experimental study
on key generation principles, i.e. temporal variation, channel
reciprocity, and spatial decorrelation, via a testbed constructed
by using wireless open-access research platform (WARP). It is
the first comprehensive study through (i) carrying out a number
of experiments in different multipath environments, including
an anechoic chamber, a reverberation chamber and an indoor
office environment, which represents little, rich, and moderate
multipath, respectively; (ii) considering static, object moving,
and mobile scenarios in these environments, which represents
different levels of channel dynamicity; (iii) studying two most
popular channel parameters, i.e., channel state information and
received signal strength. Through results collected from over a
hundred tests, this paper offers insights to the design of a secure
and efficient key generation system. We show that multipath
is essential and beneficial for key generation as it increases
the channel randomness. We also find that the movement of
users/objects can help introduce temporal variation/randomness
and help users reach an agreement on the keys. This paper
complements existing research by experiments constructed by
a new hardware platform.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, key generation, wireless
communications
I. INTRODUCTION
Key generation exploiting unpredictable characteristics of
wireless channels is information-theoretically secure [1], [2]
and has been an active research direction in physical layer
security (PLS) [3], [4]. In this technique, two legitimate users,
Alice and Bob, measure their common but noisy channel in
an alternate manner, through which they can get correlated
but not identical observations. Then they will quantize their
correlated analog measurements into binary values separately,
and their keys are usually not the same. Alice and Bob later
reach an agreement on the same key through information
reconciliation [5]. Finally, they employ privacy amplification
to remove the information revealed during the information
This work was supported by the Queen’s University Belfast University
Studentship, Newton Institutional Links Grant 172719890, Royal Academy
of Engineering Research Fellowship under Grant RF1415\14\22, and US-
Ireland R&D Partnership USI033 ‘WiPhyLoc8’ grant involving Rice Uni-
versity (USA), University College Dublin (Ireland) and Queen’s University
Belfast (Northern Ireland). This paper was presented in part at the IEEE
Global Communications Conference Workshop on Trusted Communications
with Physical Layer Security, San Diego, California, USA, December, 2015.
J. Zhang, R. Woods, T. Q. Duong, and Y. Ding are with the Institute of Elec-
tronics, Communications and Information Technology, Queen’s University
Belfast, Belfast, BT3 9DT, UK. (email: {jzhang20, r.woods, trung.q.duong,
yding03}@qub.ac.uk)
A. Marshall, Y. Huang, and Q. Xu are with the Department of Electrical En-
gineering and Electronics, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 3GJ, UK.
(email: {Alan.Marshall, Yi.Huang}@liverpool.ac.uk, emxu@foxmail.com)
reconciliation [6]. Therefore, key generation is able to establish
a cryptographic key securely from the noisy observations.
As one of the few implementable PLS techniques, key gen-
eration can be constructed in current wireless devices. Many
prototypes have been reported involving key extraction from
channel state information (CSI) in IEEE 802.11n systems [7],
[8], ultra wideband (UWB) systems [9]–[12], and FM/TV
systems [13], or from received signal strength (RSS) in IEEE
802.11 systems [14]–[17], IEEE 802.15.4 systems [18]–[23],
and Bluetooth systems [24]. The testbeds consist of laptops,
smartphones, customized platforms such as universal software
radio peripheral (USRP) [25], or any other wireless platform
that can provide sufficient channel information.
Key generation requires the channel to satisfy certain con-
ditions with respect to temporal variation, channel reciprocity,
and spatial decorrelation. Temporal variation is the main
random source for key generation, which can be introduced
by the movement of any users and/or objects in the wireless
environment. It is feasible to exploit channel randomness in
the frequency domain [7], [8], [18], [22], [26] and spatial
domain [27], [28], but the randomness is limited and cannot
be updated in a static environment. Experiments have been
carried out in the indoor and outdoor environments and have
shown that the mobility of users and/or objects is sufficient to
introduce randomness [15], [20], [21].
Channel reciprocity indicates that the signals at each end of
the same link have identical statistical features, such as channel
gains, phase shift, time delay, etc, which is the basis of key
generation systems. Although there is ongoing research effort
adopting full-duplex hardware [29]–[31], most of the current
commercial wireless devices work in half-duplex mode. Key
generation usually works in time-division duplexing (TDD)
systems and slow fading channels. Therefore, the received
signals are generally asymmetric due to the non-simultaneous
measurements and independent noise in different hardware
devices, whose effects have been studied theoretically in [26]
and experimentally in [32]. Non-simultaneous measurements
can be compensated by interpolation to emulate the channel
being measured at the same time [19], [21] while noise effect
can be suppressed by low pass filtering [26], [33].
The conclusion from applying spatial decorrelation means
that any eavesdropper located more than half-wavelength away
from legitimate users experiences uncorrelated fading. This
property is highly influenced by the channel condition [34].
In a rich multipath environment with uniform scattering,
according to the Jakes model, when the number of scatters
grows to infinity, the correlation function is the Bessel function
2of zeroth order and the signal decorrelates when d = 0.4λ
(approximately half-wavelength) [35], which is the theoretic
basis of spatial decorrelation. Some experiments have been
carried out to verify this property in UWB systems [10]–
[12] and IEEE 802.11g systems [36]. In contrast, spatial
decorrelation has also been found to not hold in some channel
conditions by simulation [37], [38] and experiments [38]–[40].
In this case, key generation cannot be deemed secure and
requires special design consideration to combat eavesdropping
when eavesdroppers are close to the legitimate users.
In order to design an effective, workable, and secure key
generation system, the above three principles, i.e., temporal
variation, channel reciprocity, and spatial decorrelation, should
be always satisfied. Although there have been a number of
theoretical and experimental studies on these principles, to
the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no thorough study
examining the effects of environment conditions and channel
parameters on the key generation. For example, [10], [11] and
[36] studied channel reciprocity and spatial decorrelation in
indoor environment by keys generated from channel impulse
response (CIR) in a UWB system and from RSS in an IEEE
802.11g system, respectively. However, key generation perfor-
mance greatly depends on the channel conditions, such as the
multipath level and dynamicity, which has not been studied
comprehensively yet. In addition, the channel parameter used
for key generation also has an impact. For example, it has been
reported that RSS-based key generation systems are subject to
predictable channel attacks [13], [15] while CSI-based systems
are robust to such attacks [7], [13].
In this paper, we study key generation principles compre-
hensively through experiments with different channel condi-
tions. We implement a testbed using a customized FPGA-
based wireless platform known as wireless open-access re-
search platform (WARP) [41], which supports IEEE 802.11
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) physical
(PHY) layer and distributed coordination function (DCF)
MAC layer protocols. This platform allows us to have full
access to the transmission parameters, which are not available
in the commercial network interface cards (NICs). A key
objective here is to make minimal or even no change to the off-
the-shelf wireless protocol, which requires cross-layer design
and presents new research challenges. Our contributions are
as follows.
• We carry out much more comprehensive experiments than
previous research in environments with various multipath
and dynamic levels. In particular, we conduct over a
hundred tests in an anechoic chamber, a reverberation
chamber, and an indoor office environment, which repre-
sents little, rich, and moderate multipath, respectively. We
consider different dynamic channels, i.e., static, object
moving, and mobile scenarios, in these environments.
Both CSI and RSS are collected from the testbed and
studied with the aim of assessing suitability for key
generation when a certain channel conditions satisfy.
• Through the comprehensive experimental results, we are
able to offer insights and advices for the design of suitable
key generation schemes in different environments and
scenarios. We found that in a dynamic environment,
(i) the randomness introduced by temporal variation is
sufficient for key generation; and (ii) cross-correlation
of the channel measurements is high enough to make
Alice and Bob reach an agreement, while in a static
scenario these properties do not hold and key generation
fails. We also conclude that multipath can improve the
security performance of key generation. In a multipath
environment, spatial decorrelation property holds and
eavesdroppers can only get very limited information,
while in an environment with little multipath such as
an anechoic chamber, eavesdroppers can obtain a highly
correlated channel and key generation cannot be deemed
secure.
• We complement existing theoretical analysis and practical
research by providing results on a new testbed constructed
by WARP and much more experiments in different envi-
ronments.
We have studied temporal variation and channel reciprocity
in CSI-based systems through experiments in an indoor of-
fice environment [42]. This paper considerably extends and
complements our previous work by providing a much more
thorough study through undertaking more detailed experimen-
tal work in an anechoic chamber, a reverberation chamber,
and an indoor office environment, and performing analysis for
both CSI and RSS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces CSI, RSS, and related IEEE 802.11 PHY and MAC
layer protocols. Section III designs the testbed and presents the
test environments and scenarios. Section IV studies the key
generation principles. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we introduce signal models of CSI and RSS,
and the related IEEE 802.11 PHY and MAC layer protocols,
which are important background for the entire paper.
A. Signal Model
The received signal in time domain can be given as
y(t) = h(τ, t) ∗ x(t− ) + n(t), (1)
where x(t) and y(t) are data input and output, respectively,
h(τ, t) is the CIR, ∗ denotes convolution,  is the time offset
in the receiver due to imperfect time synchronization, and n(t)
is the hardware noise.
RSS is currently the most popular parameter for key gen-
eration as it is available in various wireless standards. RSS is
usually reported as the average received signal power, which
can be calculated by averaging the received power over a
certain samples and written as
P (t) =
1
∆T
∫ t+∆T
t
|y(t′)|2dt′, (2)
where ∆T is the time duration of the samples. For example,
one possible method to calculate RSS specified in the Section
8.3.9.2 of the IEEE 802.16 standard [43] is
RSS = 10−
Grf
10
1.2567× 104V 2c
(22B)R
(
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
|yI or Q[n]|)2, (3)
3TABLE I
SUMMARY OF RSS-BASED AND CSI-BASED KEY GENERATION SYSTEMS
Parameter Testbed
Representative
Work
RSS
IEEE 802.11: Laptop [14]–[17]
IEEE 802.15.4: MICAz, TelosB [18]–[23]
Bluetooth: Smartphone [24]
CSI
WiFi Link 5300 NIC-based laptop [7], [8]
Customized platforms, USRP and
WARP [13], [32], [42]
UWB systems constructed by
oscilloscope and waveform generator [9]–[12]
where B, R and Vc are the ADC precision, input resistance
and input clip level, respectively, Grf is the analog gain from
antenna connector to ADC input, yI or Q[n] is the nth sample
of the I or Q branch of the signal, and N is the number of
samples. The chip CC2520 [44], a popular transceiver for wire-
less sensor networks (WSNs), calculates RSS by averaging
the received power over 8 symbol periods (128 µs), whereas
the chip MAX2829 [45], an IEEE 802.11a/b/g transceiver,
reports RSS in voltage, although it is mapped from the power.
Different interpretations inhibit the theoretical modelling of
RSS and present challenges when heterogeneous devices are
used [15], [17], [46].
The received signal in frequency domain can be obtained
by applying inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) to the time
domain signal. This is given as
Y (f, t) = H(f, t)X(f, t)e−j2pif +W (f, t)
= H˜(f, t)X(f, t) +W (f, t), (4)
where
H(f, t) =
∫ τmax
0
h(τ, t)e−j2pifτdτ, (5)
H˜(f, t) = H(f, t)e−j2pif. (6)
Here τmax is the maximum delay of the CIR. The channel
frequency responses (CFRs) can be estimated by
Ĥ(f, t) =
Y (f, t)
X(f, t)
= H˜(f, t) + ŵ(f, t). (7)
The CSI mainly includes CIR and CFR, which are related
to each other as shown in (5). CIR can be obtained in UWB
systems [9]–[12], and their testbeds are usually constructed
by oscilloscope, waveform generator, etc. CFR can be es-
timated in OFDM, which is a popular technique used in
IEEE802.11a/g/n. CFR is not publicly available in most of
the commercial NICs, but can be obtained in the Intel WiFi
Link 5300 NIC [47] or customized hardware platforms, such
as WARP or USRP.
A summary of RSS-based and CSI-based key generation
systems is given in Table I.
B. IEEE 802.11 Protocol
1) OFDM PHY: The IEEE 802.11a/g/n standards [48]
adopt OFDM for signal modulation. The physical layer packet
SIGNAL
1 symbol
LTS
2 symbols
PLCP Preamble
SERVICE
16 bits
TAIL
6 bits
Pad
STS
2 symbols
DATA
MAC header
24 bytes
MAC 
payload
FCS
4 bytes
MAC packet
Fig. 1. Structure of IEEE 802.11 OFDM physical layer packet. Cyclic prefix
(CP) is not shown for simplicity. The length of the blocks in the figure is not
scaled.
of IEEE 802.11 OFDM consists of a preamble, a SIGNAL
field, and a DATA field, as shown in Fig. 1. The preamble
is used for automatic gain control (AGC), synchronization
and channel estimation, and is equivalent to 4 OFDM sym-
bols in length. The SIGNAL field carries the information of
convolutional coding rate R and the mapping scheme for the
DATA field, forming a complete OFDM symbol. The number
of OFDM symbols of the entire physical layer packet can be
calculated as
NOFDM = 4 + 1 + d8lMAC + 16 + 6
NsubcNbpscR
e, (8)
where
lMAC = 24 + 4 + lpayload (9)
is the number of bytes of the MAC packet, lpayload is the
number of bytes of the MAC payload, Nsubc is the number
of data subcarriers, 48 in IEEE 802.11 standard, and Nbpsc is
the number of bits per subcarrier which is determined by the
mapping scheme.
In IEEE 802.11 OFDM systems, least square channel es-
timation is widely used to estimate the channel with the aid
of long training symbols (LTSs), which is composed of M (=
52) subcarriers. The estimated channel response can be given
as
Ĥuv(fm, t) = H˜uv(fm, t) + ŵv(fm, t), (10)
where fm is the mth subcarrier’s carrier frequency, u denotes
the transmitter (Tx) and v denotes the receiver (Rx).
2) DCF MAC: In IEEE 802.11, the DCF is used to coor-
dinate access to the wireless medium, which is the basis of
the standard carrier sense multiple access/collision avoidance
(CSMA/CA) access mechanism. In order to ensure reliable
reception of the unicast frame, a positive acknowledgement
(ACK) frame is transmitted from Rx to Tx after waiting a short
interframe space (SIFS) when Rx successfully receives a data
packet from Tx, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The time difference
between the data packets and the corresponding ACK packets
can be calculated by
∆tAB = tdata + tSIFS
= NOFDM × TOFDM + tSIFS
= (5 + d8lMAC + 16 + 6
NdsubcNbpscR
e)× 80
BW
+ tSIFS, (11)
where tSIFS is the time duration of the SIFS and equals to
16 µs in a 20 MHz channel spacing IEEE 802.11 OFDM
system, and TOFDM is the time duration for each OFDM
4Tx (Alice)
Rx (Bob)
Rx (Eve)
di
di
Ai
0.06 ms
di+1
di+1
Ai+1
0.96 ms
Data packet
ACK packet
...
...
...
SIFS
tB(i)
tA(i)
Fig. 2. Timing between data packets received by the Rx and ACK packets
received by Tx. The packet length and time intervals are not scaled.
symbol which can be calculated as the time for each data
symbol ( 1BW ) multiplying total number of data symbols in
one OFDM symbol (80 including CP).
When an IEEE 802.11 network is configured as an infras-
tructure basic service set (BSS), the network is handled by
an access point (AP) that broadcasts Beacon frames to all
the users, i.e., mobile stations (STAs), in its communication
range, typically every 100 ms. The Beacon carries information
about the BSS parameters, e.g., timestamp, service set identity
(SSID), Beacon interval, etc. STAs can use this information
to identify the network and keep synchronized with the AP.
III. TESTBED DESIGN AND TEST ENVIRONMENTS
A. Testbed and Experimental Design
The testbed is constructed by using WARP hardware, which
is a scalable and extensible programmable wireless platform
and allows fast prototype of physical layer algorithms [41].
Due to the limited number of WARP boards, there were eight
users in each experiment, with one Alice, one Bob and six
eavesdroppers, but this still represents a viable experimental
setup. We used the channel measurements of Alice and Bob
from one experiment to study temporal variation and channel
reciprocity, as presented in Section IV-A and IV-C, respec-
tively. In order to study spatial decorrelation, two placement
configurations were used in order to test the effect of the
location of eavesdroppers, as shown in Fig. 3. Without loss
of generality, eavesdroppers were monitoring Bob. Several
experiments were carried out by changing eavesdroppers’
distances to Bob and all the results with different distance
configurations were put together, as shown in Section IV-D.
An IEEE 802.11 reference design has been developed for
WARP v3 hardware, which is a real-time FPGA implemen-
tation of the IEEE 802.11 OFDM PHY and DCF MAC. A
Python experiment framework has also been developed to (i)
control the behavior of the PHY and MAC without interfering
with the real-time operation of the wireless interfaces, and (ii)
log the transmission parameters, such as timestamp t, received
signal power Puv(t), and channel estimation Ĥuv(f, t), etc.
The WARP and PC are connected by a 1 Gbps Ethernet
switch so that the logged data can be transferred to the PC for
further processing. In this paper, the channel measurements
Xuv(t) consist of |Ĥuv(f, tu)| and Puv(tu). The time offset,
, adds rotation to the phase of Ĥ(f, t) but does not affect the
amplitude. Therefore, the amplitude of frequency response,
i.e., |Ĥ(f, t)|, is used.
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Fig. 3. User placement
All the users were running WARP 802.11 reference design.
They operated at a carrier frequency of 2.412 GHz so the
wavelength is λ = 12.44 cm. Alice and Bob were the
legitimate users wishing to establish a secure key between
them. They were configured as AP and STA, respectively,
and formed an infrastructure BSS. Eavesdroppers were not
associated to Alice but could overhear and record all the
transmissions in the network. They also did not attempt to
initiate active attacks such as disrupting the transmissions by
jamming, i.e. only passive eavesdropping is considered.
The key advantage of the experimental setup was to make
no change to the off-the-shelf wireless standard, so the results
can be readily transferred to available commercial wireless
systems. Data and ACK packets were used for channel mea-
surement. As shown in Fig. 2, Alice sent data packets to
Bob every 0.96 ms1, which allowed Bob to get a set of
channel measurements XAB(tA). Bob was associated to Alice,
so he transmitted ACK packets to Alice upon successful
reception of data packets. The ACK packet is also modulated
by OFDM so Alice can get a set of channel measurements
XBA(tB). Although eavesdroppers were not associated to the
AP, they were able to receive all the transmissions and record
XAEj (tA). Bob and eavesdroppers can regularly update their
timing through the timestamp received in the Beacon frames,
1The WARP 802.11 reference design requires a transmission resolution of
0.064 ms and 0.96 = 0.064 × 15. As a sampling period of 0.96 ms was
deemed fast enough to track the signal variation in slow fading channels in
this paper, a multiple of 15 was deemed suitable.
5broadcast by Alice every 100 ms. As there is no sender
address in the ACK packets, they can only be distinguished
by their temporal location compared to the timestamp of the
corresponding data packets. Keeping users synchronized is
thus essential to pair their channel measurements.
In order to ensure a high cross-correlation between the
measurements of Alice and Bob, ∆tAB should be kept as small
as possible. The minimum length of MAC payload, lpayload,
required by the WARP 802.11 reference design is 20 bytes,
therefore the length of the MAC packets, lMAC, calculated
by (9), was configured to be 48 bytes in order to keep the
duration of the packet as small as possible. In this paper
the WARP boards were running at a rate of 18 Mbps, i.e.,
R = 3/4 and Nbpsc = 2. In this case, according to (11),
∆tAB = 0.06 ms. This time difference is small enough to
ensure the environments experienced by the data packets and
the corresponding ACK packets are almost the same. In a
slow fading environment, this only contributes a very small
displacement. For example, when Alice is moving at a speed
of 1 m/s, the distance she moves in this time interval is only
0.006 cm.
B. Test Environments and Scenarios
In this paper, we test the key generation performance in
different multipath environments. Over a hundred tests were
carried out in an anechoic chamber, a reverberation chamber,
and an office environment with different scenarios. Anechoic
chamber and reverberation chamber represent two extreme
environments whose special properties can help provide a
better understanding of the key generation applications in
various channel conditions.
1) Anechoic Chamber: Measurements were conducted in
an anechoic chamber located in the ECIT research center,
Queen’s University Belfast to study the key generation princi-
ples in a free space environment where there is little multipath
but always with a strong and dominant line-of-sight (LoS)
path. A setup photo with eavesdroppers placed linearly is
shown in Fig. 4(a).
2) Reverberation Chamber: Experiments were done in a
reverberation chamber located in the University of Liverpool
where a rich multipath environment was created. A setup photo
with eavesdroppers placed linearly is shown in Fig.4(b).
3) Office Environment: The experiments were also carried
out in an office environment in the ECIT research center,
Queen’s University Belfast, which is a typical indoor envi-
ronment with cupboards, chairs, desks, etc.
We considered different scenarios to study the key genera-
tion performance under various levels of channel dynamicity.
We tested three scenarios for the experiments in the anechoic
chamber and office environment.
• Static: All the users were stationary with no movement
in the room.
• Object Moving: All the users were stationary with an
object, a person, moving at the speed of about 1 m/s
in the room.
• Mobile: Bob and eavesdroppers were stationary while
Alice was put on a trolley and moved by a person at
the speed of about 1 m/s.
In the reverberation room, we rotated two stirrers continuously
at 5 degrees per second in order to create a dynamic environ-
ment.
IV. STUDY OF KEY GENERATION PRINCIPLES
In these experiments, the key generation principles, i.e.,
temporal variation, channel reciprocity, and spatial decorre-
lation, were studied. We also evaluated the randomness of
the key sequence quantized from the measurements. Unless
otherwise specified, measurements were taken for 60 s, which
is much larger than the coherence time of the channel (in the
order of 10 ms) and long enough to represent the channel
variation.
The channel measurements, i.e., CSI and RSS, were then
quantized into binary values using single-bit cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF)-based quantizer [19], which is given
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 CDF-based quantization algorithm
INPUT: Xuv(t) % Analog channel measurement
OUTPUT: KXuv % Quantized key bits
1: F (x) = Pr(Xuv(t) < x)
2: η0 = −∞
3: η1 = F
−1(0.5)
4: η2 =∞
5: for j ← 1 to N do
6: if Xuv(tj) < η1 then
7: KXuv(j) = 0
8: else
9: KXuv(j) = 1
10: end if
11: end for
Temporal variation can be quantified by the temporal auto-
correlation function (ACF). In a wide sense stationary (WSS)
random process, the ACF is irrelevant of the observation time
t but only determined by the time difference ∆t, which is
defined as
RXuv (∆t) =
E{(Xuv(t)− µXuv )(Xuv(t+ ∆t)− µXuv )}
E{|Xuv(t)|2} ,
(12)
where E{·} denotes the expectation calculation and µXuv is
the mean value of Xuv(t).
Signal similarity is quantified using the Pearson correlation
coefficient, expressed as
ρXuv,u′v′ =
E{XuvXu′v′} − E{Xuv}E{Xu′v′}
σXuvσXu′v′
, (13)
where σXuv is the standard deviation of Xuv(t). The correla-
tion coefficient is used in the analysis of channel reciprocity
and spatial decorrelation.
Since the channel measurements of users are not identical
due to non-simultaneous measurements and noise, there are
key mismatches between users after quantization. The key
disagreement rate (KDR) can be defined as
KDRXuv,u′v′ =
∑Nk
j=1 |KXuv(j)−KXu′v′(j)|
Nk
, (14)
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Bob and Eves
(a) Photograph of experiment setup in the anechoic chamber located in the
ECIT research center, Queen’s University Belfast
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(b) Photograph of experiment setup in the reverberation chamber located in
the University of Liverpool
Fig. 4. Experiment setup
where KXuv and K
X
u′v′ are the keys quantized from Xuv(t) and
Xu′v′(t), respectively, and Nk is the length of keys. KDR is
an essential parameter for key generation and determined by
the cross-correlation and quantization scheme [36]. Therefore,
KDR is also used to evaluate channel reciprocity and spatial
decorrelation.
A. Temporal Variation
Temporal variation is commonly adopted as random sources
for key generation since it can be readily introduced by the
movement of the users and/or objects in the wireless environ-
ments. A wireless channel can be modelled as a wide sense
stationary uncorrelated scattering (WSSUS) random process
in a rich scattering multipath environment [49]. Under this
assumption, it has been analyzed through simulation in [26]
that OFDM subcarrier’s channel response Ĥuv(fm, t) is a
WSS random process.
In this section, temporal ACFs of CSI and RSS were
calculated from the experimental results in the anechoic
chamber, the reverberation chamber, and the office environ-
ment. RĤuv (fm,∆t) and RPuv (∆t) were calculated using
(12) by substituting Xuv(t) with |Ĥuv(fm, t)| and Puv(t),
respectively. The experimental results in the anechoic chamber
are plotted in Fig. 5 for static, object moving, and mobile
scenarios. For CSI, only RĤBA(f1,∆t) was selected as an
example for brevity, as other subcarriers’ ACFs were quite
similar.
As there is no interference from other wireless networks
inside the anechoic chamber, the channel remains the same
in the static scenario. Therefore, the variation of the received
signal is only due to the hardware noise, which is temporally
uncorrelated, as shown in Fig. 5(a). This seems beneficial
for key generation as the samples are temporally indepen-
dent, however, it is challenging for the users to agree on
the same key as discussed in Section IV-C. In the object
moving and mobile scenarios, as shown in Fig. 5(b) and
Fig. 5(c), respectively, the samples are correlated in the time
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Fig. 5. Normalized temporal ACF, R
ĤBA
(f1,∆t) and RPBA (∆t), in the
anechoic chamber. t2 = t1 + 10 s.
domain and RĤBA(f1,∆t) and RPBA(∆t) only depends on
∆t but is irrelevant to the observation time t, indicating both
|ĤBA(f1, t)| and PBA(t) are WSS random processes.
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Fig. 6. Normalized temporal ACF, RXBA (∆t) and RXAB (∆t), at t1 in
the office environment with mobile scenario.
The curves of RĤuv (fm,∆t) and RPuv (∆t) are quite
similar, although we did observe from experiments that
|Ĥuv(fm, t)| usually decorrelates a little faster than Puv(t),
with an example shown in Fig. 6. In addition, RXuv (∆t) in
different scenarios varied because it is affected by both the
environment and channel variation introduced by movement
of users/objects.
The experimental results in the reverberation chamber and
the office environment also indicate that in a dynamic envi-
ronment, i.e., mobile and object moving scenarios in office
environment and stirrer moving scenario in the reverberation
chamber, |Ĥuv(fm, t)| and Puv(t) are also WSS random
processes. Their ACF curves are similar to Fig. 5(b) and
Fig. 5(c), and not plotted for brevity. As a WSS random
process, when the time intervals between the samples are fixed,
they will have the same correlation between each other. As a
consequence, in a dynamic channel with users/objects moving
at a constant speed, it is feasible to use a fixed rate to probe
the channel, simplifying the channel probing design of the key
generation.
B. Randomness
Temporal variation is the main random source for key
generation. An experiment was run with the same setting
as the mobile scenario in the office environment but lasted
300 s in order to collect more data for randomness evaluation.
The channel was originally sampled at a rate of 0.96 ms, at
which there exists redundancy between adjacent data samples.
Therefore, the measurements were resampled by a period of
Tp and then quantized to binary values using the single-bit
CDF-based quantization scheme introduced in Algorithm 1.
The optimal probing rate Tp can be found by evaluating
the randomness of the key sequence. The normalized ACFs
are shown in Fig. 6, from which the correlation coefficient
RĤAB (f1, Tp) and RPAB (Tp) can be read. It may be observed
that RXBA(∆t) and RXAB (∆t) overlap each other.
The randomness of the key sequence was evaluated by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
random test suite [50], which has been widely used in key
generation applications [7], [8], [14], [15], [20], [21], [24],
[26]. There are 15 tests in total, each evaluating a specific
randomness feature, e.g., frequency test focuses on the pro-
portion of ones and zeros, and DFT test detects the periodic
feature of the sequence, etc. Each test returns a P-value, which
TABLE II
RANDOMNESS TEST RESULTS OF KEY SEQUENCES QUANTIZED FROM CSI,
|ĤAB(f1, t)|. THE GRAY CELLS FAIL THE RANDOMNESS TEST.
Corr coeff X% 56.9% 44.2% 32.5% 20.2% 14.1% 10.2%
Tp (s) 0.1 0.5 1 1.5 1.8 2
Sequence length 2998 598 298 198 166 148
Frequency 1 1 1 0.887 0.877 1
Block frequency 0 0.859 0.869 0.596 0.48 0.596
Runs 0 0 0.005 0.156 0.536 0.324
Longest run of 1s 0 0.052 0.575 0.361 0.1 0.568
DFT 0.183 0.252 0.41 0.493 0.915 0.821
Serial 0 0 0.153 0.458 0.714 0.760 0.589 0.145 0.278 0.468 0.862
Appro. entropy 0 0 0.038 0.291 0.732 0.614
Cum. sums (fwd) 0.027 0.503 0.855 0.767 0.898 0.969
Cum. sums (rev) 0.027 0.503 0.855 0.634 0.766 0.969
TABLE III
RANDOMNESS TEST RESULTS OF KEY SEQUENCES QUANTIZED FROM
RSS, PAB(t). THE GRAY CELLS FAIL THE RANDOMNESS TEST.
Corr coeff X% 65.8% 51.1% 38% 23.1% 16.4% 12.2%
Tp (s) 0.1 0.5 1 1.5 1.8 2
Sequence length 2998 598 298 198 166 148
Frequency 0.001 0.086 0.203 0.887 0.088 0.411
Block frequency 0 0.31 0.495 0.377 0.289 0.724
Runs 0 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.942 0.271
Longest run of 1s 0 0.002 0.038 0.402 0.121 0.361
DFT 0.397 0.694 0.193 0.493 0.413 0.597
Serial 0 0 0.28 0.212 0.502 0.4440 0.858 0.98 0.82 0.362 0.716
Appro. entropy 0 0 0.012 0.011 0.231 0.32
Cum. sums (fwd) 0.001 0.144 0.264 0.634 0.148 0.718
Cum. sums (rev) 0 0.082 0.365 0.51 0.175 0.568
is compared to a significance value, α, with typical value in the
range of [0.001, 0.01]. When the P-value > α, the sequence
is accepted as random. We chose α as 0.01, the same as other
work [7], [8], [14], [15], [20], [21], [24], [26]. We ran 8 tests,
over half of the test suite, which still satisfies the requirements
of NIST. Some of the tests require extremely long sequences
which were not applied in this paper. For example, random
excursions variant test recommends the input sequence longer
than 106, which is currently not available in our experiments.
The randomness test results of keys quantized from
|ĤAB(f1, t)| and PAB(t) are shown in Table II and Table III,
respectively, where the gray cells fail the randomness test, i.e.,
P-value < α. As may be observed from the tables, when the
correlation between the two adjacent measurements is high,
the key sequence fails several tests. Temporal ACF describes
how fast the signal decorrelates against time and thus can
be used to determine the optimal probing interval. Too short
a probing interval between two adjacent measurements will
result in sample redundancy and impact the randomness of the
key sequence, while too large an interval will lead to a low
key generation rate (KGR) and limit its practical application.
In this example, the system cannot generate a random key
sequence from |ĤAB(f1, t)| until the correlation coefficient
between adjacent samples is below 20.2% and the probing
rate Tp reaches greater than 1.5 s, which is the optimal probing
rate.
C. Channel Reciprocity
The channel fading at each end of the link is reciprocal.
However, the signals measured by each user are asymmetric
8due to the non-simultaneous measurements and the uncor-
related hardware noise. The similarity between the received
signals of Alice and Bob can be quantified by the cross-
correlation relationship defined in (13) and KDR defined in
(14) by substituting XAB(tA) and XBA(tB).
The cross-correlation coefficients and KDR of the experi-
ments in the anechoic chamber, reverberation chamber, and
office environment are depicted in Fig. 7(a), Fig. 7(b), and
Fig. 7(c), respectively. As shown in Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(c),
when the channel is static, the independent hardware noise is
the only contributor to the signal variation, therefore the cross-
correlation coefficients are almost zero. The corresponding
KDRs in the static channel are around 0.5, which are no
better than a random guess. This makes key generation un-
operational as the legitimate users are not able to reach an
agreement.
As shown in Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(c), in the mobile scenarios,
the correlation coefficients are high, and all the KDRs are
acceptable and could be later corrected by information recon-
ciliation techniques. For example, BCH code can correct up to
25% key disagreement [26]. In the object moving scenario in
the anechoic chamber and office environment, the correlation
is not as high as in the mobile scenario. This is because when
one user is moving, the channel is changing more significantly
than the object moving scenario where only some paths are
affected. However, as may be observed from Fig. 7(c), when
there are two objects moving in the office environment, the
correlation is as high as that of the mobile scenario, which
means the increased movement helps improve the correlation.
This can also be observed from the results of the reverberation
chamber, where there is rich multipath.
In all the examples, ρPAB,BA is higher than the correspond-
ing ρĤmAB,BA. As shown in (2), RSS is calculated by averaging
over one packet, therefore, some of the noise effects have been
canceled out. In addition, the channel estimation Ĥuv(fm, t) is
subject to synchronization errors such as frequency and timing
offset.
D. Spatial Decorrelation
Spatial decorrelation is essential to the security of key
generation systems. KDR is usually used to quantify the
disagreement between Alice and Bob. However, it can also
be extended to quantify the disagreement between legitimate
users and eavesdroppers. The cross-correlation coefficient and
KDR can be calculated using (13) and (14), respectively, by
substituting XAB(tA) and XAEj (tA). The average correlation
coefficient of channel estimation can be given as
ρ¯Ĥuv,u′v′ =
1
M
M−1∑
i=0
ρĤmuv,u′v′ . (15)
The average KDR of channel estimation can be written as
KDR
Ĥ
uv,u′v′ =
1
M
M−1∑
i=0
KDRĤmuv,u′v′ . (16)
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Fig. 7. Cross-correlation coefficients, ρXAB,BA, and KDRs, KDR
X
AB,BA, of
CSI and RSS with static, object (stirrer) moving, and mobile scenarios in
different environments.
In this section, we use ρ¯Puv,u′v′ and KDR
P
uv,u′v′ to represent
ρPuv,u′v′ and KDR
P
uv,u′v′ , respectively. Then we could use
9ρ¯Xuv,u′v′ and KDR
X
uv,u′v′ for the simplicity of notation.
1) Eavesdroppers in Linear Placement: Multiple experi-
ments were carried out with different distance configurations
but the same setup shown in Fig. 3(a). The results of CSI and
RSS are shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, respectively. The points
with distances smaller than 0 are the average correlation co-
efficients, ρ¯XAB,BA, and average KDRs, KDR
X
AB,BA, between
Alice and Bob, which are shown for comparison.
As can be observed from Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, the shapes of the
curves in the same environments obtained by CSI and RSS are
quite similar while the absolute values are slightly different.
As shown in Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 9(a), for the mobile scenario
in the anechoic chamber, when the eavesdroppers were in
the proximity of Bob, their correlation coefficients, ρ¯XAB,AEj ,
fluctuate greatly. This effect is more severe in an environment
with strong LoS, as the same phenomenon is not observed
in the reverberation chamber and office environment. In the
mobile scenario of experiments in the anechoic chamber, even
when eavesdroppers are separated far enough from Bob, e.g.,
40 cm (about 3λ) in this section, ρ¯XAB,AEj reaches a high
level and remains almost constant. In an environment with
little multipath such as anechoic chamber, the signal variation
is mainly due to the change of the LoS. Therefore, these
nodes experience similar signal variations and high cross-
correlation. In the object moving scenario, some ρ¯XAB,AEj are
even higher than ρ¯XAB,BA when eavesdroppers are close to
Bob. The system cannot be deemed secure in these dynamic
scenarios as the KDR
X
AB,AEj are very close to or even smaller
than KDR
X
AB,BA. In the static scenario, all the users, including
legitimate users, cannot reach an agreement on the same key
sequence.
The results from reverberation chamber are shown in
Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 9(b). There is very rich multipath in
the reverberation chamber, therefore, no matter how close
eavesdroppers are located from the legitimate user, their signal
paths are very diverse. Thus, eavesdroppers’ signals have little
correlation with Bob’s. KDR
X
AB,AEj are always around 0.5,
which indicates that eavesdroppers almost have no information
of the keys quantized by the legitimate users.
The experimental results from the office environment are
between the above two extreme cases, as shown in Fig. 8(c)
and Fig. 9(c). The multipath helps decrease the spatial correla-
tion between the users and KDR
X
AB,BA is much smaller than
KDR
X
AB,AEj . This is very beneficial for the security of key
generation as it indicates that eavesdroppers cannot get any
useful information about the key generated by the legitimate
users. The results of the mobile scenario validate the analysis
in [36], where the authors studied spatial decorrelation by
collecting RSS via laptops in an indoor environment.
It is worth noting that in the reverberation chamber and
office environment, even when the eavesdroppers are very
close to the legitimate users, their received signals are quite
different. However, in a strong LoS environment such as an
anechoic chamber, even when the eavesdroppers are several
wavelengths away (3λ in this example), they can still observe
a high correlated signal from the legitimate users. Therefore,
special attention is required to thwart eavesdropping in envi-
ronments with strong LoS. Multipath is usually considered
to be detrimental to wireless systems as it increases the
complexity of the equalizer, however, it is beneficial in key
generation application due to the uncertainty introduced.
2) Eavesdroppers in Circular Placement: Further experi-
ments were carried out by putting six eavesdroppers around
Bob in a circle as shown in Fig. 3(b)2. The experiments were
done in the reverberation chamber with stirrer moving scenario
and in the office environment with mobile and object moving
scenarios.3 Eve4 and Eve5 were located between Alice and
Bob while Eve1 and Eve2 were behind Bob. However, as can
be observed from Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, there seems no rela-
tionship between ρ¯XAB,AEj and the location of eavesdroppers,
because in a multipath environment, the signal is coming from
all directions due to the reflection, scattering, and refraction,
etc. This property is quite beneficial for key generation, as even
if eavesdroppers are located between the legitimate users, they
still cannot get a better correlation.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper comprehensively studied key generation princi-
ples, i.e., temporal variation, channel reciprocity, and spatial
decorrelation, by using CSI and RSS collected from experi-
ments. The testbed was implemented using WARP reference
design, which supports IEEE 802.11 OFDM PHY and DCF
MAC. This enabled us to measure the channel using data and
ACK packets without any change to the off-the-shelf wireless
protocol. Over a hundred experiments have been carried out
in an anechoic chamber, a reverberation chamber, and an
office environment with static, object moving, and mobile
scenarios. The key generation principles were studied by the
experimental results. Both CSI and RSS were proved to be
applicable for key generation.
Through the comprehensive experimental results, we offer
insights and guideline for the key generation system design.
When the channel is sufficiently dynamic, temporal variation
is an ideal random source and the legitimate users are able
to agree on the same key. However, in a static channel,
the cross-correlation between the channel measurements of
two users is too small and the key mismatch cannot be
corrected. In a multipath environment, the spatial decorrelation
is satisfied and the security of the key generation system is
guaranteed. In an environment with little multipath such as
an anechoic chamber, eavesdroppers could observe a highly
correlated signal to the legitimate users, which results in
potential information leakage and requires special attention.
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